Rule Following: A Criterion for Wittgenstein's meaning as Use Theory

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ABSTARCT: Since the publication of *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* by Saul Kripke, there have been controversial interpretations of what it means by 'rule following' with regard to the question of meaning. Kripke maintains that Wittgenstein's paradox of rule following demands us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. This boils down, according to Kripke, to the conclusion that either of the choice ends up with a dilemma which calls for a solution yet again to yield another sceptical solution. Rivals to Kripke like McDowell and Wright have argued that if we seriously read Wittgenstein we realise that a dispositional choice is plausible. Others like Patrizio Lo Presti, for example, have defended Wittgenstein by positing that there is no need to separate mental and behvioral items in the first place and that Wittgenstein is misinterpreted. Following this line of thinking, this paper contends that rule following is an essential criteria for Wittgenstein theory of meaning as use. It takes the view that if the paradox forces us to make a choice then it is plausible to choose behavioral items as satisfying rule following and so meaning. The paper thus adopts the position that, when discussing the concept of language game to the conclusion that the meaning of a word is but its use, Wittgenstein successfully uses the concept of rule following to reach this conclusion. Simply, meaning as use is realized when people follow the rules of language. They are neither written rules nor syntactical rules but semantic rules of language based on context. Thus, in our daily conversations and practical life humans tend to follow rules, sometimes without being familiar with that, to successfully understand each other and take actions on various issues at hand. This begins right from the moment we learn language.

KEYWORDS: Rule following, meaning as use, dispositional and mental phenomenon, family resemblances, forms of life, implicit rules.

INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses what is meant by rule following in Wittgenstein use theory of meaning. It first presents the fact that language has to enhance communication. Then it argues that there is a relationship between language and human doings. The relationship begins right from the moment we learn that particular language. In learning language we learn how to do things with words—this is to follow a rule. Therefore understanding language means doing. Also understanding means following rules. To follow a rule means to understand the meaning of words. The paper adopts the view that meaning, understanding and rule following presupposes doing.

2.0 WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE GAME

Michael W. Nicholson reports to us that "Wittgenstein conceived the analogy between games and language while watching a football game. As he observed the progress of the game, 'the thought first struck him that in language we play games with words.' The term language—game appears in *Blue and Brown Books* and is developed still further in *Philosophical Investigations*."[1] This is to signal that as players in the football game follow rules, so speakers too in conservation follow the rules of language based on context. It is not about playing with words but working in accordance with the rules. According to Nicholson "the concept of language games is somewhat of a central organizing principle in *Investigations,* clustering around itself Wittgenstein's notions of

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1. Michael W. Nicholson, "Abusing Wittgenstein: The Misuse Of The Concept Of Language Games In Contemporary Theology" *Journal Of The Evangelical Theological Society* JETS 39/4 (1996) 617–629

family resemblances in language, rules, forms of life, and meaning as use."[2] All these have something to do with the question of meaning. Especially the concept of language game and meaning as use are closely related so much that some philosophers take them as synonyms.

Reading 68, 81–86, 198–202, 206 and 208 remarks of the *Investigation,* we learn that Language games also indicate the relationship between language and rules. Nicholson comments that "Wittgenstein did not intend, by pointing to the use of rules in the playing of games, to say that the practice of language is essentially the strict observance of pre-existing rules. It is the similarity of the practice of language to the playing of games as a rule—guided activity—that the concept of language games is meant to bring out."[3] However, rules can be invented, altered, broken, and play different roles in both games and language. Moreover, it is not the rule that establishes the practice of games or language but the practice that presupposes the rules. Therefore the meaning of words depends on the practises (uses) which in turn depend on the rules. It is this understanding that makes Wittgenstein conclude that the meaning of words is its use.

John Skorupski has observed that "the simple sounding idea: to understand a word is to know how to use it..."[4] has proved to be one of the corner stone ideas of the meaning as use theory. Further Skorupski adds that to understand an expression or a sentence is to master its use within a grammatically structured means of communicating. The meaning of a word, he writes, "is its use in the language." Elsewhere in the *Blue and Brown books*, Wittgenstein says "the use of the word in practice is its meaning."[5]

It is generally fair to take it that Wittgenstein's understanding of 'meaning' is not something outside use. It is the meaningful use of words that he is talking about. Hence, he is not 'explaining' what meaning is, by reference to something other than meaning. Saloomeh Jahan forouz has insisted that "it is not as if we could say 'here the word, there the meaning'—as one might speak separately of 'the money, and the cow that you can buy with it. The meaning of a word and its use should rather be compared with the value of money and its use. Money has value, within a given community, because of the way it is used. Thus 'the value of money is its use."[6] The irony here is that Wittgenstein no longer thinks that meaning depends on concrete observable things outside there, rather meaning is to be understood on how people use words in various context.

3.0 LANGUAGE HAS TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION

Human beings are the creatures that speak and do. It is widely understood that language aims to facilitate communication among humans. Language is our principal means of communicating, though it isn't the only one we use. We communicate when we transmit information about ourselves to others and receive such information from them. Our expressions, stances, gestures, and movements, even if unconscious, convey information and are part of our communication styles.

"Much recent work in the philosophy of language," Max kolbel observes, "has been concerned in one way or another with questions concerning the interaction between the standing meaning of expressions and the context in which they are used (contextualism)."[7] The relationship between language symbol with its meaning is not determined by the presence of a bond between the two, but is determined by agreement or convention between the speakers of the language. The Linguist Sitti Rabiah has taken the understanding that "From the point of the listener and the speaker, the language has a function as a directive, which regulates the behaviour of the listener."[8] From this angle, it can be said that language not only makes the listener to do something, but the activities are consistent with what the speaker wants. This can be done by the speakers through sentences that express a command, direction, demand, or seduction. It should be added here that what we mean is generally connected to what our words mean. For a successful communication, therefore, it calls for the general agreement among people on what the meaning of words are. When, what the speaker means departs from what the sentence means, this only signals what Wittgenstein calls language game and Grice calls it intention.

In the *Investigations,* from proposition §185 to §242, we are made to understand that if language it is to be a means of communication, then it requires agreement both in definitions and in judgements. So in the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein describes an example of a 'primitive' language on how it can be used for communication between a builder and his assistant:

The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For

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2. Nicholson, "Abusing Wittgenstein" 619.

3. Nicholson, "Abusing Wittgenstein" 620

4. John Skorupski, *A Companion To The Philosophy Of Language,* Edited *by* Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998), 30.

5. Wittgenstein, *The Blue Book* (Wittgenstein Project, 1956), 27.

6 . Saloomeh Jahanforouz, "Wittgenstein's Concept Of Language," *Research Gate* (2019): 32, DOI: 10.13140/2.2.35572.40325

7. Kolbel, *A companion to the philosophy of language,* 251.

8. Rabiah, *Language As A Tool For Communication,* 4.

this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab" and "beam". A calls them out; – B brings the stone he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.[9]

This example of primitive language has received multiple interpretations.

Briefly, to Wittgenstein, language is neither complete nor incomplete; language is simply useful and capable of changing or adjusting itself contextually. Wittgenstein's advocacy of imaging such a primitive language as complete is to signal the usefulness of that language at that context yet with possibility of changing. The point here is that language should always enable communication in a given context. To achieve this, language has to simply be useful contextually. That is why at §18 Wittgenstein warns his readers that "Don't let it bother you that languages (§2) and (§8) consist only of orders. If you want to say that they are therefore incomplete, ask yourself whether our own language is complete..."[10] So to Wittgenstein it is possible to imagine such a language and that such language is complete at that context.

The concept of context has recently received attention among Philosophers, so much that the Philosopher Kent Bach has argued "what a speaker means in uttering a certain sentence, as well as how her audience understands her, "depends on the context". That is why Philosophers and linguists often say that "certain words (and sentences containing them) are context-sensitive, that what they express is context-dependent"[11] This line of thinking agrees with Ribes-Iñesta' stance that Language is the medium in which any social practice takes place and becomes possible. By medium Ribes-Iñesta means the medium represents where the phenomenon of meaningful social practice takes place. The medium represents the functional condition that makes the phenomenon possible. Social practice is possible only in a medium conceived of as convention, invented or created through that very practice itself.[12] That is why Wittgenstein says, language like any other is founded on convention. Language as a medium involves the overall net of meanings relating social practices and products in which a particular activity may have sense. It includes the context and the elements of possible language games which allow for the varied activities of individuals within a social and cultural environment.

4.0 THE CONCEPT OF RULE FOLLOWING

In the *Investigation,* at remark 201, Wittgenstein presents the paradox regarding rule following;

"This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here."[13] An attempt to formulate this paradox led to what came to be known as the standard formulation of the paradox.

Kripke's work, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,* made it so famous that Wittgenstein meant a dispositional and interpretation criticism on rule following. That is, to follow a rule, consist neither in doing nor interpretation. This line of thinking has influenced many without a spare of criticisms from rival philosophers. To understand one reason for critiquing Kripke, one has to understand that rule following in language has different connotation from mathematical rule following of which Kripke takes them to be similar. This has been argued by Cesare Cozzo in his article *Rule-following and the Objectivity of Proof.* Winch on his part has observed that

> A number of commentators have argued Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's paradox misses what Wittgenstein says in paragraphs 201 and 202. (Baker & Hacker 1984, McDowell 1998: 226 ff, Ammereller 2004: 133 ff.) What Kripke nevertheless doesn't miss is Wittgenstein's insight, that following a rule in the use of a language is a social practice and not an activity of an isolated individual. One might even argue that Kripke's detour via the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of mathematics cogently shows that there is no alternative understanding to rule following as a social practice.[14]

So while Kripke has brought a nice insight at fore, it is nevertheless still true that his efforts to dismiss Wittgenstein's argument is fruitless. This is because earlier in propositional 201 Wittgenstein reveals the paradox and he later quickly tells us that the paradox is based on a misunderstanding, which is to think that there is no way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation. He writes: "It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another one standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation."[15] That is why Indrek Reiland have commented "The real

9. Wittgenstein, *PhilosophicalInvestigation,*8.

10. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation,*11.

11. Kent Bach, *The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Language,* Edited by Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2014), 153.

12. Ribes-Iñesta, "Human BehaviorAs Language," 27.

13. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, #201

14. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl Munich "The Practice of Following Rules" (2017): 5, DOI 10.1515/witt-2017-006.

15. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, #201

lesson here is that there must be a way of grasping a rule that is not a matter of adding an interpretation and that is achieved by training that institutes one into an enduring practice."[16]

According to McDowell "grasping a rule is always an interpretation, is something we would think if we conceived of a rule in such a way that there is always a gap between 'the instruction one received in learning [an] expression and the use one goes on to make of it, between 'the expression of a rule given in training' and an action in conformity with it."[17] McDowell stresses that "we would open such a gap if we conceived of a rule as a mere sound or inscription, something which is in itself devoid of meaning and thus 'normatively inert,'[18] and Verheggen regards it as something which in itself cannot contribute to determining what course of action is the correct one.[19] It should therefore be understood that Wittgenstein takes it that to understand meaning is simply to follow the semantic rules of that language. We know a person has followed the rules when he acts accordingly. As such the meaning of language is but its use.

As in the examination of understanding, here too the example with which Wittgenstein works is that of a rule for an arithmetical series. The use of arithmetic has been interpreted by Hacker as "he originally meant to continue these sections with the mathematical discussions. But it may also be because the conceptions of accord with a rule, of following a rule, and of something's following from a rule that he is combating are at their most powerful in such an arithmetical example"[20]. As he further notes, with this it can be said that acting thus-and-so counts as applying the rule correctly. But the rule is not a magical device from which the correct applications unfold. Any rule, given by a rule-formulation, can be misunderstood, interpreted wrongly, and hence misapplied. Correct application of a rule is a criterion of understanding. But what makes a given application of a rule correct? Not intuition; not accord with what the teacher meant; not, doing the same as one was shown in a previous example; and not an interpretation. There is an internal relation between a rule and its extension.[21] Its extension is what Wittgenstein calls human behaviour (doing). And therefore meaning as use consists in doing and following a rule—doing the right action.

This is clearly supported by Hacker's point that "If a rule requires one to V in circumstances C, then V-ing in C is what is called 'obeying the rule.' The internal relation is forged by the existence of a practice, and regularity in applying the rule, and the normative behaviour that surrounds the practice. Only when such complex forms of behaviour are in play does it make sense to speak of there being a rule at all, and of rule-following behaviour that accords with it. He concludes that they express a rule only if they are used as the expression of a rule, a norm of correctness, a justification for acting thus-and-so, an explanation of action, in the context of a persistent practice.[22]

The conclusion of this lengthy discussion of following a rule is brought to bear on language and linguistic meaning. Human beings agree in the language they use, they agree in what counts as applying a given rule (in particular a given explanation of meaning) correctly. Such agreement does not decide what is true and what is false. It determines shared concepts and mutual understanding and doing the right actions.

It can be said that human behaviour cannot be understood if we separate language and social practice. Language without social practice and social practice without language are senseless. At this point Ribes-Iñesta considers language as an instrument by means of which we directly affect the behavior of others, and indirectly the objects and events in the world and ourselves. Language is like a set of tools whose proper use produces desired effects. Language, as an instrument, means effective use in relation to the behavior of other individuals. Because of this, learning language as a medium is deeply interlocked with its use as the instrument of conventional practice. As Wittgenstein insists "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that."[23] The basic idea here is that through language we humans accomplish our conducts. Thus the functions of language are highly diversified in their effects on social life: to name, to describe, to ask, to communicate things, to teach, to learn, to do things, to reject, to look for, to invent, and so on. Generally language is an instrument when the individual learns the meanings of his own actions in and through words. Or as Austin puts it, words in actions or as actions. Wittgenstein says "without language we could not communicate with one another, but for sure: without language we cannot influence other people in such-and-such ways; cannot build roads and machines, etc. And also, without the use of speech and writing people could not communicate."[24] Ribes-Iñesta

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[16] Indrek Reiland, "Rule-Following I: The Basic Issues" *Philosophy Compass* DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12900

[17] John McDowell, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," *Synthese* 1984, 58: 325–363 at 332. Quoted also in Claudine Verheggen, "Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning," *Blackwell Publishing Ltd*. 26:4 (2003): 2.

[18] John McDowell, "Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," in P. French, T. Uehling and H.Wettstein (eds), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XVII, The Wittgenstein Legacy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 42.

19. Claudine Verheggen, "Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning," *Blackwell Publishing Ltd*. 26:4 (2003): 2, ISSN 0190-0536,"

20. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume ii,* 14.

21. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume ii,* 14.

22. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume ii,* 14.

23. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation,* 340.

24. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation,* 491.

alludes that the meaning of words is always linked to the experiences as actions and outcomes involved in social practices. This means that any human activity is impregnated with language because it takes place in an environment that is built up through language and as language. And therefore once an individual masters a language game and is able to drift from one language game into another, language is no longer restricted to functioning as an instrument to affect the world, but it becomes the instrument that gives meaning to the world. This is what Wittgenstein calls form of life.

For Wittgenstein, along with others such as Dewey and Quine, language is intrinsically social. This is true especially to the concept of rule following. Wittgenstein does hold a community view of rules, the view that the objectivity of rule-following is essentially social. By the "objectivity of rule-following," is meant "the fact that rules distinguish between correct and incorrect applications ... and that they impose a constraint on the behavior of the individual that is independent of his mere say-so ("the necessity of rules")."[25] Thus our practices and actions are rule governed. And the rules are directives of the individual amidst the community. To Wittgenstein it is language that influences actions. The basic idea is that mental states has nothing to do with our actions—it is the language game that impacts people's actions when successfully observe the rules.

While some philosophers have argued that Wittgenstein's advances, in the rule-following sections of *Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, are destructive, others have positively acknowledged them as constructive to the question of meaning. McDowell, Baker and Hacker, take Wittgenstein as solely concerned to undermine certain seductive misconceptions of meaning and count it an error to interpret him as providing support for any skeptical or revisionary theses about meaning and related matters as considered by Kripke, Wright and Carruthers. Following Bob Hale we maintain that it is arguably fair to consider both parts. That is to accept some merits of both sides. Horwich in identifying the difficulties of following strict syntactical rules of language, is in line with Wittgenstein observation that

> In general we don't use language according to strict rules […]. We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules. This is a very one sided way of looking at language. In practice we very rarely use language such as a calculus. For not only do we not think of the rules of usage—of definitions, etc.—while using language, but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren't able to do so.[26]

Therefore the exact rules (explicit rules) of language are required to be replaced by the rules which Horwich call implicit rules. The implicit rules are the ones that Wittgenstein takes to be understood in the language game—they are never written somewhere.

> The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The learner is told it and given practice in applying it. Or it is a tool of the game itself. Or a rule is employed neither in the teaching nor in the game itself; nor is it set down in a list of rules. One learns the game by watching how others play it. But we say that it is played according to such-and such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the way the game is played a like a natural law governing the play. But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players' mistakes and correct play? There are characteristic signs of it in the players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of someone correcting a slip of the tongue.[27]

So it turns out that it is through observing other people's actions one can learn the rules and follow them. Thus we learn meaning through people's actions because it is meaning that influences people's actions. This is in line with Horwich's comments that "I am not relaying on S's practice of self correction to identify precisely which actions are to count as violations. Am relying on it merely to motivate applying terms such as violations to cases of nonconformity—cases that have been identified as deviations from the ideal law"[28] So the rules to be observed here are not the rules of syntax, calculus, or the rules of physics, astronomy or the rule of nature but the rules of language game that influence people's actions.

4.1 Meaning, Rules and Understanding as Doing

The rule-following considerations are about linguistic meaning and understanding. Up to this point there is agreement. But opinions are different about the conception of understanding which Wittgenstein attacks. According to John McDowell the target of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations is the view that "understanding is always interpretation."[29] On his part Winch takes Wittgenstein's conclusion that "'following a rule' is a practice" … explains, what no interpretation whatsoever was able to explain. As I don't think that the practice of following a rule is meant to explain anything at all."[30] While Winch has made a good attempt yet he has forgotten one important point especially when he discusses his four questions: (1) Does the rule I follow determine my linguistic practice? (2) Does my practice determine the rule I'm using? (3) Are both the rules and the practice independent from my individual rule following? (4) Does the common practice determine the rule following in general and collectively?[31] He is wrong to

25. Ribes-Iñesta, "Human BehaviorAs Language," 28.
26. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation,* 31.
27. Wittgenstein, *The Blue Book*, 25.
28. Horwich, *Wittgesntein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy,* 116.
29 . Cesare Cozzo, "Rule-following and the Objectivity of Proof" *Research Gate* (2015): 4, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255597255
30. Munich "The Practice of Following Rules" 138
31. Munich "The Practice of Following Rules" 139

consider it wrong for the Investigations to offer positive answers to all the four questions while in fact it is the case. While he acknowledges that the *Investigation* offers positive answers to both questions, on the contrary he "does not think that this is true because the answers to the first two questions are obviously mutually exclusive. Either the rule determines my practice or the other way around but not both at the same time."[32] The problem with Winch judgment is that he has forgotten the irony of the paradox that any answer can be proved true in either case, that is any action can be made to accord with a rule. This in turn gives room to only practice (action) as the proper explanation of following a rule and so meaning. That's why Wittgenstein recommends that it is the actions of men that make us understand what it is to follow a rule.

From propositional §§133–142 Wittgenstein tasks himself with exploring the relationship between understanding and doing. He begins by dismissing the picture theory of meaning that the general propositional form and of the conception of the propositions of logic as senseless. Wittgenstein uses the terms 'fitting' and 'belonging' to introduce his next theme, That the meaning of a word, he has argued, is its use. We typically grasp what a word means, as used in a sentence, as soon as we hear it. But the complex use of a word in all its variety of combinations and contexts is something that is manifest only over time. How can what we grasp in an instant fit the use? Is what we grasp not the use? Is the meaning, after all, distinct from the use, something from which the use follows? The meaning of a word is what is given by an explanation of meaning. But such an explanation, a rule for the use of the word, does not always come to mind when one hears and understands the word. To this Hacker asks the question "how can one grasp the meaning of a word or utterance at a stroke, and yet the meaning be the use? To answer this, the concept of understanding must first be investigated."[33] The idea here is that to grasp a meaning means to get an understanding.

But what does Wittgenstein mean by understanding? Different philosophers have interpreted Wittgenstein differently. Stroud and Jason Bridges for example have taken Wittgenstein to mean, "one's understanding is a matter of being guided by an image in one's mind. To understand an expression's or utterance's meaning is to have an image in your mind that you can consult when you need to use or respond to the expression or utterance, and that will then show you how to proceed."[34] They call this idea the guidance conception of understanding. The problem with this is that meaning turns out to be a psychological phenomenon—this is contrary to Wittgenstein's insight.

Hacker interprets propositions §§143–184 of the *Investigation*, as being ambitious to undermine the idea that understanding is a state that contains the use or application of a word in advance of its being used, so that the use flows from this mental state like water from a reservoir.[35] The idea here, which Hacker shares with us, is that Wittgenstein simply rejects the idea that understanding is a mental phenomenon. The propositions put forward the thesis that understanding is doing. Doing is the core. Thus the positive purpose is to clarify the categorical status of understanding. Doing is, indeed, criteria of understanding. To clearly understand this part, consider what Wittgenstein writes:

> When A gives an order, B has to write down series of signs according to a certain formation rule. Let the first of these series be that of the natural numbers in the decimal system. How does he come to understand this system? And here we may imagine, for example, that he does copy the figures by himself, but not in the right order: he writes sometimes one, sometimes another, at random. And at that point communication stops. Or he makes a systematic mistake; for example, he copies every other number, or he copies the series 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,... like this: 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4, Here we shall almost be tempted to say that he has understood us wrongly.."[36]

This has the irony that understanding meaning consists also in putting the understanding into actions. That is we see the understanding of a person through his actions. Bridges too notes that "we do often, in everyday life, explain people's performances by citing their consultations with guides, with images or signs that show or tell them what to do.[37] It is meaning that tells people what to do. Note that here a skeptic can raise the charge similar to that epistemological problem raised by Edmund Gettier: That a person can successfully put his understanding into action only by chance not by really having the correct understanding of meaning. Then the question arises, does that person really understand? The relevant counter examples here were provided by Frankfurt, Davidson and Daniel Bennett, where Myles Brand calls them "consequential waywardness" and "antecedential waywardness". Standardly, this is known as the problem of causal deviance. This can be counter argued that still we were capable of discerning that only when he made the attempt to put his understanding into intended effort, that an action occurred. If he didn't make an attempt to act, it would be difficult for us to think on whether he understand or not. All this proves the necessity of actions in assessing understanding. This applies also to a person who has mastered a certain meaning and has correctly achieved to put it into actions hundred times but only at a single instance wrongly put it into action. This doesn't mean the person has not yet mastered the meaning.

32. Munich "The Practice of Following Rules" 139

33. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1,* 13.

34. Jason Bridges, *A Companion to Wittgenstein Edited* by Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2017), 377.

35. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1,* 13.

36. Wittgenstein*, Philosophical Investigations*, 62.

37. Bridges, *A Companion to Wittgenstein*, 379.

It only tells us that actions are the mirror for assessing understanding. Thus, Wittgenstein concludes at proposition §146 that Understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use. The application or doing is still a criterion of understanding.

To emphasize this point we can consider the remarks that Wittgenstein make at proposition 151. He writes "but there is also this use of the word "know": we say "Now I know!" and similarly, "Now I can do it!" and "Now I understand!"[38] All this is to signal the coherence of understanding and doing. Nevertheless Marie poses the question, "Is meaning understood only so long as is put into action? Is it that the whole use somehow comes before my mind in an instant, when I hear a word and understand it in this way? But how can the whole use of a word come before my mind? Is it that what comes before my mind fits a particular use?"[39] The same kind of question is asked by Wittgenstein "how does someone say 'Slab!' and mean 'Bring me a slab'? How does someone mean 'Five slabs' as a report rather than an order? How do we give something a name?"[40] This is the question of the connection between meaning and actions. That is how does meaning bring about doing? This is the question of intention. It is intention that connects meaning and actions.

4.3 How Do We Learn Language

Rule following is also evident in language learning. Here language learning does not consist in explaining but in training, that is how we do things with words. Wittgenstein writes:

> The children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others. An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word "slab" as he displays that shape.... I do not want to call this "ostensive explanation"...I will call it ostensive teaching of words"[41]

To this Ribes-Iñesta has noted that "Learning of language as a medium involves three components: a) learning actions, b) learning words and their use, and c) learning about things and words (i.e., understanding actions and objects through language)."[42] These are the bases involved in learning any language game and, very specially, the early language games taking place during "acquisition" of language.

All this shows how words and actions go together. In explaining Sentence §2, Wittgenstein says, "In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. However, in instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points at the stone"[43] These are what Wittgenstein calls language games. If it is to be asked how does this ostensive teaching of words succeed in establishing an association between, say the word 'slab' and a particular shape of building stone. Wittgenstein suggests that our first thought will be 'that a picture of the object comes before the child's mind when he hears the word. If we ask the question, does the fact that the word 'slab' prompts the pupil to form an image of a slab mean that he has understood the word, or mastered the language? To answer this question, Wittgenstein suggests, we need to ask what the purpose of the word 'slab' is in the language of this tribe.[44] Uttering a word in this language, he suggests, might be like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination. This simply means that it is the use of words that matter not the mental activity.

However, this is not the purpose of the use of the language of the imaginary tribe of builders; it is not the purpose of their use of the words 'slab', 'block', 'pillar' and 'beam' to evoke images in the mind of their hearers. Wittgenstein concedes that forming such images might help a hearer attain the actual purpose of uttering these words, but the actual purpose is use. When Wittgenstein says "A is building with building-stones; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out; —B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call."[45] He means that the purpose of language is not merely to help the hearer to form an image of things but rather enable him to do something. So yes language helps one to form an image of something but this is only to words that name things. To other kind of words, they enable us form an image of what is to be done with such words. That is why Wittgenstein says, don't you understand the call "Slab!" if you act upon it in such-and-such a way?[46] To this Marie comments "there is no doubt that the ostensive teaching of words plays a role in bringing this about, but the function of the words of this language is given only with its embedding in the activity of building, and it is only by mastering this function—i.e. by mastering the use of words within this activity—that the pupil fulfils our ordinary criteria for understanding the language."[47] That is why it is possible for one party to call out words and the other acts on them.

38. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 65.
39. McGinn, *Wittgenstein and The Philosophical Investigations*, 85.
40. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation,* 59.
41. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 7.
42. Ribes-Iñesta, "Human Behavior As Language," 114.
43. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 8.
44. McGinn, *Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations*, 42.
45. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 6.
46. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 7.
47. McGinn, *Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations*, 43.

CONCLUSION

In summary, Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning, if taken seriously, has the implication that the meaning of words consists in following semantic rules based on context. According to this theory, understanding the meaning of words means being able to do things with words. And we correctly do things with words when we follow the rules. Understanding therefore is not a mere mental phenomenon but consists in doing.

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