

Philology and Its Status (In in The Context of Other Sciences)

Professor Jakub Z. Lichański,

SOCIETATIS SCIENTIARUM VARSAVIENSIS; Extraordinary Member of the Who is Who Gesellschaft für biographische Forschung, Editor-in-Chief FORUM ARTIS RHETORICAE, ORCID 0000-0002-1943-5069

ABSTRACT: The question of the importance of philology in comparison to other humanities and the so-called natural sciences seems strange because it automatically poses a different question: what is literature, which is the subject of philological research? These questions have been asked many times; the most comprehensive answer was given by August Boeckh and it is worth returning to his opinions, especially since some of Boeckh's concepts return in the works of Chris Mantzavinos, James Turner and Branko Senegačnik. However, I am asking them again now because the second of them, that is, literature, results, in my opinion, from the answer about the status of philology as a science. Its subject is literary texts and the way or rather method of studying them; which in turn makes it necessary to refer to the proposals of Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden. At the same time, it is necessary to ask the question whether the methods of philology and philology itself say anything about knowing the world? Moreover: does this research allow for the formulation of any hypotheses concerning questions of an epistemological and ontological nature? If the answers to these questions are positive, it will mean that philology will cease to be just a method of studying literary texts, but will be a science that pronounces some important statements about the world. And these statements will have epistemological value.

KEYWORDS: philology, rhetoric, logic, philosophy, ontology, epistemology, theology, Pindar, Homer, Platon, Aristotle, Anaximenes, M.T. Varron, Dante, I. Kant, A. Boeckh, J.I.M. Bocheński OPP, G. Korbut, S. Skwarczyńska, J.W. Rożdżestvenskij, J. Turner, R. Ingarden, C. Mantzavinos, B. Senegačnik, W. Heflik, M. Schramm

INTRODUCTION

The question about the status of philology in the context of other sciences, including mainly the so-called exact sciences, seems strange because it somehow automatically raises another question: what is literature, which is the subject of philology? These questions have been asked many times; however, I am asking them again now, because the second of them, that is, about literature, results, in my opinion, from the answer about the status of philology as a science (Boeckh 1886; Senegačnik 2021, 103-125). Its subject is literary texts and the way or rather method of studying them (Korbut 1924; Skwarczyńska 1948; Rożdżestvenskij 1979; Mantzavinos 2005; Turner 2014). At the same time, the question should be asked whether the methods of philology and philology itself say anything about knowing the world and, more importantly, about obtaining truth (Bocheński 2024, 86-87)? Moreover, does this research allow us to formulate any hypotheses concerning questions of an epistemological and ontological nature (Boeckh 1886)¹? The latter states unequivocally (ibid., 33)²:

Through its methodology, philology realizes a third, secondary goal, which is the theory of knowledge cognition, i.e. understanding in general. Understanding is a difficult art used in all sciences; because the development and application of all

¹ Boeckh's views were discussed, among others, in Maciej Junkiert's study *Reason, Idea, Philology. Intellectual History in the Context of Literature (Written on the Margins of Cyprian Norwid's "Silence")* [Rozum, idea, filologia. Historia intelektualna w kontekstach literatury (pisane na marginesach „milczenia” Cypriana Norwida)], “Pamiętnik Literacki” 2021, no. 3, pp. 233-256.

² Earlier on the same page, Boeckh says: *Philology and philosophy arose without any original practical direction, only in the name of knowledge. Later they also became practical, because all science has an influence on practice. The other sciences, on the other hand, were originally practical and concerned with life; theoretically and for their own sake, only later were they practiced, initially in order to establish practical aspects. In this respect, only philology, like philosophy, can replace it as an auxiliary science, in so far as the theory of the individual disciplines has its historical foundation in it. This is most obvious to the theologian, lawyer and statesman; at least a part of classical philology is indispensable in architecture and the visual arts, as well as in the mathematical and natural sciences.*

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sciences occurs through joint work and therefore requires mutual understanding between cooperating scientists. In this sense, **philology is a methodological propaedeutics of all sciences** (underlined - JZL).

If the answers to these questions are positive, as in the case of the quoted judgment of August Boeckh, it will mean that philology will no longer be considered only a method of studying literary texts, but will be a science that pronounces some important statements about the world. And these statements will have epistemological value. Chris Mantzavinos adds important remarks, according to whom hermeneutics will play an important role in these considerations (Mantzavinos 2005; Mantzavinos 2016, P. 23):

Hermeneutics as a methodology of interpretation can provide guidelines for solving problems of interpretation of human actions, texts and other significant materials, offering a set of tools based on solid empirical evidence. Throughout its historical development, hermeneutics has dealt with specific problems of interpretation, arising in specific disciplines, such as jurisprudence, theology and literature, which were not the subject of this article.

The consequences of such a result are far-reaching. It turns out that literary texts, seemingly only serving to "make life more pleasant", have some additional meaning. What that is – that remains to be considered.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Previous knowledge of philology seems to question such far-reaching conclusions, although August Boeckh's study contradicts this (Boeckh 1886; Senegačnik 2021, 103-125). Its subject is, among others, linguistic texts of a specific shape, i.e. literary texts, and their cognitive value is, on balance, small (I am omitting other issues that the German researcher raises in his monumental work). If anything, it is, in a form not subject to the rigors of, for example, logic (Kant 2005), the presentation of some content presented in other texts, e.g. scientific or philosophical, subject to the aforementioned rigors of scientific procedure.

First, we need to present the principles of philology as a methodology and methodology of literary research. Their sources are the tradition of the so-called the Alexandrian school (Alexandria, 3rd century BC) and then the tradition of Origen (3rd century AD), who definitively shaped the basic framework of one of the important analytical methods of philology³; his theory initially referred exclusively to the analysis of the Bible. In this approach, the text was analyzed through the description of four spheres of its meanings (definitively defined by Augustinus de Dacia, and Dante)⁴:

- i. Literal meaning (sensus literalis), littera gesta docet [literal meaning that teaches what happened]
- ii. Allegorical meaning (s. allegoricus), quid credas allegoria [allegorical meaning – what to believe]
- iii. Tropological/figural meaning (s. tropologicus), moralis quid agas [moral example, what to do]
- iv. Anagogical W. (s. mysticus / anagogicus), quid speres anagogia [what goal is being pursued]

However, earlier there appears a concept called theologia fabulosa; it comes from the Roman polymath, Varro (Marcus Terentius Varro, 2nd/1st century BC)⁵. His theories were criticized by St. Augustine (Augustine, De civ. Dei, 6.1-4); nevertheless, this theory must be remembered, because for the analysis of some literary works it is quite fundamental (Lagercrantz 1970). I believe that this is a specific attempt to reconcile Plato's rigorism with Aristotle's formal description and Anaximenes' principles of criticism.

In order to correctly determine the starting point of theoretical considerations, we must go back to the times of Plato and Aristotle, not because we like it, but because their approaches to this issue have determined our understanding of these issues⁶.

³ Cf. Berthold Altaner, Alfred Stuiber, *Patrology*. [*Patrologia. Życie, pisma i nauka Ojców Kościoła*] *The Life, Writings, and Teaching of the Fathers of the Church*, translated by Paweł Pachciarek, IW PAX, Warsaw 1990, pp. 294-295 (Referring to the Platonic trichotomy, Origen distinguishes a triple meaning of Holy Scripture: somatic (literal, historical-grammatical), psychic (moral), pneumatic (allegorical-mystical)); Shawn W.J. Keough, *The Eternal Gospel: Origen's Eschatological Exegesis*. in: Lorenzo di Tommaso, Lucian Turcescu. Eds., *The Reception and Interpretation of the Bible in Late Antiquity...*, Ed J. Brill, Leiden, Boston 2008, pp. 193-226.

⁴ Cf. Nielsen 2009, 211-479 (cf. also [https://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadrige_\(fortolkningsmetode\)](https://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadrige_(fortolkningsmetode))), 21-02-2023). Lagercrantz 1970, 99-100ff. cf. also „Przegląd Thomistyczny“ 2004, vol. X.

⁵ Cf. Kumaniecki 1977, 488: *The first book* [from the work *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum* and the book *de rerum divinarum* – note jzl] [...] introduced the well-known Stoic division into three types of theology: mythical, or the theology of poets (mythicon), natural, or the theology of philosophers (physicon) and state, or the theology of politicians (civile), with Varro emphasizing state theology, which contains elements of mythical and philosophical theology; here too he identified the god of philosophers (Stoic) with the Roman Jupiter and the Jewish Jehovah, who had no statues. We therefore have a certain “minor” problem: I would like to point out that the definition given by Kumaniecki indicates a deeper meaning of the concept of the theology of poets. The term mythicon is, however, something slightly different than the term fabula, fabulosa. If I stick to the term Theologia fabulosa, and not mythicon, it is because of the already established terminological tradition. However, I will return to the issue indicated here in the further part of my argument.

⁶ I refer to the further quoted warning by Teresa Kostkiewiczowa that we use concepts that originally meant something else (I mean concepts from the field of aesthetics, but their meaning reached towards axiology), cf. Kostkiewiczowa 1996, 13. And also

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Plato	Aristotle
General aversion to literature (literature is a lie) Only religious literature, or hymns to the gods PL., resp., II.379D, X.607A,	Formal description DL - with a suggestion of the philosophical nature of DL (modality?) ARIST., poet., IX. 1451b6-7. Division of expression, including artistic expression, into two spheres: lexis and dianoia ARIST., poet., XIX.1456a35–1456b15; ARIST., rhet., The problem of understanding and interpreting a text, or hermeneutics ARIST., herm., The problem of criticism ANAX., rhet ad Alex.,

Philology, which arises from a specific combination of the above-mentioned directions of thinking about the connections between the two fields, initially perceives the text as consisting of two layers: literal and figurative/metaphorical. This can and should be associated with the view, definitively described by Wolfram Ax, who indicated that every linguistic statement breaks down into two parts: lexis and dianoia (Ax 2000, *passim*). Lexis describes the formal shape of the statement, dianoia – all changes in this shape that occur when we enclose a thought in a specific form⁷. One could risk suggesting that – since I am openly referring to the views of Immanuel Kant – lexis is the equivalent of Kantian analytic judgments *a posteriori*⁸. In this situation, dianoia corresponds to synthetic judgments both *a priori* and *a posteriori*⁹. I will not develop the indicated analogies in more detail at present, although I believe that – although Kant did not deal with these problems (apart from general remarks in the Critique of Judgment) – his reflection on judgments well explains the feature of language that was definitively described by the aforementioned Wolfram Ax (Ax 2000, *passim*; Lichański 2008, 247-256).

However, it is now necessary to indicate certain features of the methodology of research procedure in philology. They include the following elements of procedure in philology (Korbut 1924; Skwarczyńska 1948; Rożdżestvenskij 1979):

What are the general assumptions of philology as a method of researching works?

1. Firstly – reading¹⁰ (and reading it multiple times!) of the work being researched;
2. Secondly – determining the final shape of the work being researched¹¹;
 - 2.1. Already at this level we begin textual criticism
 - 2.2. And then – criticism of literary forms¹² [it includes criticism of genres (Formgeschichte), criticism of messages (Traditionsgeschichte), as well as – criticism of editing (Redaktionsgeschichte)]
3. Thirdly – describing the relationship between the world of the work and the reality outside of literature, or outside of art;
 - 3.1. Here hermeneutics becomes an important tool¹³ (ARIST., herm.; Lonergan 1976, 155-172 et seq.); it includes such issues as: i. understanding the text, ii. assessing the correctness of understanding the text, iii. formulating the concept of correct understanding of the text;
 - 3.2. However, it should be expanded to include: i. understanding the subject, ii. understanding the words, iii. Resolution author's knowledge, iv. self-understanding, v. evaluation of the correctness of the interpretation, vi. explanation, vii. establishing the meaning of the text

to a certain remark by Roman Ingarden, who pointed out that values are subjective and it is we who “assign” them, e.g. to works of art, cf. Ingarden 2017, 106.

⁷ I will not take up the issue of similarity to the assumptions of either structural or generative linguistics, because this is not the place for such considerations. Among other things, because Ax's remarks, although they can be treated as a general suggestion, refer to the Greek language; I universalize this remark with full awareness that, although intuitively it is probably true, in order to become a scientific thesis it would have to be solidly documented on very extensive linguistic material. See also ([*Językoznawstwo strukturalne*] *Structural linguistics*, 1979, *passim*; Ax 2000)

⁸ Cf. Kant 1957, I.70ff (B11-12ff): The former may be called explanatory judgments, the latter judgments extending [our knowledge]. At the stage of *lexis* we only explain how “the proposition functions”, whereas at the stage of *dianoia* we extend its scope.

⁹ Ibidem, it should be added that: *experiential judgments as such are all synthetic*. Of course, because understanding the content of a sentence comes from our experience (e.g. familiarity with similar sentences, situations that are described by sentences, etc.), knowledge, etc. But also from the fact that we read a given sentence, or sentences (texts), or get to know them at different times and in different circumstances (peristases)!

¹⁰ Or another form of perception of the work being examined.

¹¹ Referring to the considerations of the New Philology – especially in the matter of editing, see, among others, the comments by M.J. Driscoll 2021 – it should be noted that we are neither reconstructing a hypothetical ur-text, nor determining the best editing, but describing the text GIVEN TO US IN THE RESEARCH.

¹² Terminology from: Berger 1987, *passim*.

¹³ See comments in next footnote!

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4. Fourthly – an attempt to interpret the work – of course using the results of hermeneutical research¹⁴.

It is worth quoting here the remarks of Chris Mantzavinos on hermeneutics, or more precisely – the research questions that we should ask (Mantzavinos, 2016/2018, p. 2):

- i. Who (is the author) (quis/persona)?
- ii. What (is the subject matter of the text) (quid/materia)?
- iii. Why (was the text written) (cur/causa)?
- iv. How (was the text composed) (quomodo/modus)?
- v. When (was the text written or published) (quando/tempus)?
- vi. Where (was the text written or published) (ubi/loco)?
- vii. By which means (was the text written or published) (quibus facultatibus/facultas)?

In principle, they are close to Lonergan's view, but – on the other hand – they come close to questions from the scope of status theory (Statuslehre) within the theory of rhetoric (téchne rhetoriké). At the same time, I believe that Mantzavinos' proposal presents well the research method within philology. We can say that this research method is the principles of scientific procedure and the action(s) that we undertake in the course of philological and, more broadly, scientific research in the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) and exact sciences (Naturwissenschaften). This results from the fact that in both of these types of sciences in summa we will proceed in accordance with specific principles and actions, and operate with texts, and their construction is subject to, among other things, rules described by Wolfram Ax (Ax 2000) and by the theory of rhetoric (téchne rhetoriké). And this also applies to formalized and informal languages (Lichański 2018, 21-37).

In this way, we have determined the methods of procedure suggested by philology; let us add immediately enriched by the remarks on the analysis of literary text proposed by Origen and supplemented by Augustinus de Dacia, and Dante. As a method of examining the sphere of dianoia, we must use the methods suggested by the theory of rhetoric (Volkmann 1885/1987; Asper 2019, 655-674; PHIL., 2006, passim; Lichański 2007, II. passim).

In the latter proceeding, the topic¹⁵ will prove to be extremely important, but perceived as described by Robert E. Curtius, Bertold Emrich, Tim Wagner, Klaus Ostheeren, Gregor Kalivoda, Filippo Ranieri, Valeska von Rosen, Hermann Danuser, Stefan Jordan, Martin Gessmann (Curtius 1997; Emrich 1977, 235-263; HWdR 2009, Bd. 9, Kol. 605-626, 630-724), necessarily supplemented with a topic referring to the so-called loci theologici (Szymik 1990–1991, pp. 162–163). The latter can probably be treated as a starting point for compiling a much more extensive list of sources from which evidence can be drawn, or rather – motifs and threads that, together with characterization, make up the plot – than the one used so far. To some extent, such a work may be the Motif-Index of Folk-Literature (Thompson 2023), which gives us a much larger collection of not only sources, but also certain plot patterns.

It may then turn out that the research we conduct using the methods described by philology allows us to describe the world and our behavior in it as precisely as other sciences. As Albert Boeckh (Boeckh 1886, 804), quoted earlier, says:

I believe that I have shown, although limiting myself to antiquity, how in philology all separate knowledge is formed into a great unity, when in tangled and unclear material ideas are recognized, in which the mind alone finds satisfaction and clarity. The formal perfection of science consists in systematic unity, even if materially everything seems unfinished and will remain unfinished forever. But the very idea of philological science, which I have tried to dissect, is infinite in the range of ideas it embraces, which is why the encyclopedic view can never be exhausted. [...] Meanwhile, although we learn so much about what lies beyond us, we cannot forget the gnōthi seauton (γνῶθι σεαυτόν). Without constant self-examination, one misunderstands the knowledge of oneself and others and easily falls into error through passion [rather – too hasty generalizations – note JZL]. The encyclopedic view also protects against this. For the more you know, the more clearly you will be able to distinguish the boundaries of knowledge and ignorance.

Philology, precisely because at subsequent stages of learning about the subject of its research, requires, as it were, continuous control of that subject, as well as of one's own judgments about it, allows one to maintain a critical view of the subject of research and also of our judgments about it. Rhetoric, which is one of the most important tools of this research, only suggests to us a set of


¹⁴ Here, following Lonergan, cf. Lonergan 1976, I understand hermeneutics as: *the ability to interpret texts, including literary ones, as well as sources*, e.g. the Bible, but also Chris Mantzavinos, *Hermeneutics*, SEP 2016-06-22 (2018-07-11). Also Chris Mantzavinos, *Naturalistic Hermeneutics*, Oxford 2005.

¹⁵ Let me remind you that topics, i.e. *general sources* (Greek *topoi*, Latin *loci*) from which evidence can be drawn, and suggestions on how the speaker/creator should learn the entire field in order to be able to use the knowledge drawn from it correctly. It should also be remembered that toposes can also be treated as general rules of conduct, which are presented as obvious and do not require proof, after: Lichański 2007, I.112. here it is necessary to recall that rhetoric, according to scholars, belongs to the *Organon*, i.e. the logical writings of Aristotle, cf. (Windelband 1888, 258-265; Windelband 1905, 387 sqq; *thanks to grammar and rhetoric we have learned the correct rules of thinking*; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1905, 100-101sqq; *die Theorie der Rede (=Rhetorik), soweit sie mit der zusammenhaengt Logik, hatte Aristoteles wissenschaftlich fundiert*).

questions, among others in the section devoted to the so-called science of status, which we should ask both of the subject of research, and of our judgments, and, to some extent, of ourselves.

EXCOURSE – RHETORIC AS A THEORY OF TEXT AND A THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION BASED ON UNCERTAIN PREMISES

Why do I consider rhetoric to be a theory of text and a theory of argumentation based on uncertain premises? What evidence do I have for this in the texts of rhetoricians? Well, a careful reading of the texts of Aristotle, Cornificius, Quintilian and Hermogenes confirms that this is the case. All the indicated theorists of the art of rhetoric (*téchne rhetoriké*) indicate that the aim of their lecture is to teach how to prepare a speech/text. We can consider a speech as a text, because the very division of rhetoric into “parts” determines, as Gert Ueding rightly reminds us (Ueding 2000), the phases of speech/text construction. Karl-Heinz Göttert clearly reminds us of this when he shows how speech/text depends on the individual phases of its creation and what the mutual dependencies of these phases are (Göttert 1991, 230):



- In the figure, we have in the first line: genres (rhetorical types and their dependence on what time/events our text/speech will concern [past, future, contemporary],
- questioner [guesses, definitions, legal questions, questions about procedures], speaker's tasks [logos, ethos, pathos];
- in the second line (inventing ideas, division of ideas, memorization, linguistic presentation, delivery/presentation).
- I would like to point out that in the sub-items to the second line, we have indicated how each of them influences/conditions the preparation of the text and what questions should be answered in the course of developing the text: it is also important how it will depend on, among others, tropes and figures and general principles/rules of text preparation [linguistic correctness, clarity, tropes and figures used (Schmuck)].

I would like to remind you that, as Göttert puts it, this is the perspective of the person preparing the speech/text. And it results from the indications contained in the aforementioned treatises.

A special role here falls to the inventio phase, and in it to the science of status – its most complete exposition is contained in the treatise by Hermogenes (HERM., de stat., passim), but also to the topice (ARIST., top., passim; ARIST., anal., passim), which prepare the argumentative part of the speech/text. Here it must be remembered that these issues were also discussed by Diogenes Laertius (DL., IX, 11.79-94) and definitively presented by Maximus of Ephesus (Walz 1968, V.577-590; Lichański 2017, 54-76). However, the next phases: dispositio and elocutio, i.e. the arrangement of the speech/text and its verbal shape, constitute a kind of “traps”. Firstly, the arrangement of speech/text must determine where we “start” from and where we want to get to (telos – goal). Secondly – the choice of vocabulary includes: tropes and figures (which can also and usually do have the value of arguments), composition (periodic arrangement, extremely important for speech, less so for written text, as Quintilian pointed out), and finally issues of style and the so-called idea of style (which Hermogenes mainly pointed out).

The phases of memoria and actio are also important, because they are connected with the issue of the speaker’s memory, but also the audience’s memory of the matters that are raised in the speech/text, and with presentation (actio), where there are also issues

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such as: voice, so-called body language, gestures, but also clothing (these issues were presented most fully by Cornificius and Quintilian).

One could accuse the said person of referring to speech, not written text. The remark is correct, but only to a certain extent. Here, every speech, every text must be presented (actio) in some way, that is, it must be prepared for this presentation. Cornificius clearly states this (CORN., rhet.ad her., IV.56). The method, in my opinion, is irrelevant: the speech/text must be "ready" before the presentation, that is, fully prepared and checked.

EXCURSION II – PHILOLOGY AS A METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCES NOT ONLY HUMANISTIC

It is worth and necessary to consider whether Philology can actually be considered, as August Boeckh suggested (Boeckh 1886), as a methodology not only of the humanities (Geistwissenschaften) but also of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). What are the additional premises that allow for such a far-reaching hypothesis?

From the considerations presented so far, it follows that in Philology itself, perceived as a method of description and analysis of texts (spoken and written, or in another form, e.g. with the addition of illustrative material, etc.), it is well described, cf. the remarks in the previous subchapters. Additionally, both such tools as rhetoric (*téchne rhetoriké*) and hermeneutics also have a well-defined methodology. Therefore, they meet the condition indicated by Father Bocheński (Bocheński 2024, 87-121).

We can therefore say that both the principles of scientific procedure, the actions we perform in the research process, and the principles of logic¹⁶ are observed in the research process. Does probability also appear here? As indicated by the cited example from Pindar's ode¹⁷, this condition is also met, because what we refer to after the poet as memory of the deed, which can be considered a specific type of intuition in the understanding of Kant, meets this condition, because both the memory of the deed itself and intuition in the understanding of Kant are de facto, in our research, only probability. This results from the fact that the procedure using the tools of rhetorical theory (*téchne rhetoriké*), including mainly the science of status (Statuslehre), and hermeneutics do not give us absolutely certain knowledge, but only probable knowledge¹⁸.

It may be objected that these principles define only issues concerning the study of texts, and not research procedures in general, e.g. in the experimental sciences. However, even in such procedures the results of experiments must be presented in the form of texts, and then they are subject, ex definitio, to the rules described above¹⁹. Each time we describe a certain work (the described result of the experiment), and it is subject in turn to certain rules that he presented, yes, for a literary work, but this can be extended to all texts (Hartmann 1958, Bd. 3, 314-321).

DISCUSSION

The basic problem that this text may raise is related to the problem of basing some of the arguments on quite old literature on the subject (Boeckh 1886; Windelband 1888, 258-265; Windelband 1905, 387 sqq; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1905, 100-101sqq). And not engaging in discussion with newer approaches, which, in the opinion of many researchers, have led to the rejection of older findings (Junkiert 2021, 233-256, especially p. 240sqq). I do not think that this is the right approach (Senegačnik 2021, 103-125). The Serbian researcher says unequivocally (ibidem, 103):

[Boeckh] built an extensive system of philological methodology and defined the goal of philology as "knowing what was previously known". Of particular importance to his theory is the emphasis on the role of human individuality in both the creation and interpretation of texts: individuality cannot be known and defined conceptually, but rather explained through intuition (durch lebendige Anschauung). This idea has historical significance: individuality played a very large role in phenomenological and psychological interpretations of 20th-century literary works, and initially also in reception theory; contemporary anthropological, cognitive and social models of research, due to which it loses its meaning and significance, even without consequences for the prevailing understanding of literature as a whole.

This is an important observation, because it emphasises the importance of the individuality of both the creator and the recipient, including the researcher. For we are to try to discover it in our research, or to explain, as Boeckh says, durch lebendige Anschauung, which can be understood as either a view or an intuition, as Senegačnik suggests, and Kant would consider as intuition (Kant 1971, A20/B35)²⁰.

¹⁶ Let me remind you that the theory of rhetoric (*téchne rhetoriké*) belongs to Aristotle's *Organon*, cf. note 16.

¹⁷ See further notes, including footnotes 20 and 21. A fragment from Homer's *Odyssey* is also given in the final section of these considerations.

¹⁸ Cf. Lalande 1972, 612: *Elle [Aristotle dans Metaphisique] comprend la knowledge of the chosen divines in meme temps que celle des principes des sciences et de l'action*. Cf. also, apart from the literature cited earlier, the considerations of Sir Bertrand Russell, cf. idem, *Our Wissen von der Außenwelt*. (1914), Übers. v. W. Rothstock, Meiner Vlg., Leipzig, 1926.

¹⁹ These issues were discussed, among others, quite a long time ago, e.g. in *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung* 1929, 299-338.

²⁰ I. Kant, *Krytyka czystego rozumu*, transl. R. Ingarden, PWN, Warszawa 1957, vol. I, p. 95. I indicate the original edition and provide only the page numbers according to the German editions, cf.: Heflik 2016, 464. The analysis conducted by Włodzimierz Heflik in the cited study, concerning the understanding of the concept of Anschauung in Kant's philosophy, allows us, among

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It is worth pointing out a fragment of one of Pindar's lyrics, in which the poet says (Pindar 1981, 37 [Olymp. VI. 18-19])²¹:

But many people remember,
if a fine thing is done with toil.

The poet raises the problem of memory of an act, which can be considered a specific type of visibility [or eyewitness] in Kant's understanding; I believe that this is one of the fundamental issues for the type of research I am defending. Literature is often tasked with preserving and also, to some extent, explaining, and sometimes suggesting, the course of events of both man and the world.

Theoretically and practically, other sciences do this, but...

It is literature, or rather a literary work of art, or perhaps a work of literary art, that does this by trying to show the various entanglements of the actions undertaken by the protagonists and antagonists, while the work itself is perceived as an object (Hartmann 1958, Bd. 3, 314-321; Ingarden 1960; Sartre 1968). The question of how authors do this depends on the individual artistry of the creator; our task as researchers is to be able, precisely thanks to the methods of philology, to "sift out" what the writer "added" to the description of the world and the people acting in it, and what is a reliable description of specific problems (Hartmann 1958, Bd. 3, 314-321; Ingarden 1960; Lichański S. 1967, 9-69; Senegačnik 2021, 103-125; Heflik 2016, 463-477). This is what *téchne rhetoriké* (theory of rhetoric) teaches, even in the part called the science of status, when it tells us to analyze the problem that we want to present; let us add - usually as a question, i.e. something that we have to answer or to which we are looking for an answer. Here, of course, hermeneutics is helpful, i.e. the ability to interpret texts, including literary ones, as well as the sources that the creator reaches for and uses²². I would like to point out that Chris Mantzavinos emphasizes in his study *Naturalistic Hermeneutics* that (Mantzavinos 2005):

The central thesis propagated by Mantzavinos is therefore that there is no fundamental methodological difference between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

Since hermeneutics occupies an important place in philological research, I believe that this thesis can be extended to philology.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of these considerations are quite obvious. Philology, even if limited to the study of texts, has a well-defined methodology, and more broadly – a metaphysics of science, because one means the properties of objects defined by methodology. Let μ denote metaphysics (=the knowledge of divine things at the same time)²³, α (principles of scientific procedure), δ (action(s)), λ (logic), ρ (rhetoric), π (probability), then

$$\mu \equiv (\alpha, \delta, \lambda, \rho, \pi)$$

which means that by metaphysics we understand the set of the above-mentioned elements (components), or that metaphysics consists of the above-mentioned elements (components). This means extending the scope of the meaning of the concept of metaphysics itself, but at the same time it is in accordance with the judgments of Gabryl and Czeżowski that metaphysics is a definition of the most general properties of objects (Gabryl 1903, *passim*; Czeżowski 1948, 25). The above formula (in the form of definition by enumeration) is just another expression of the same judgment. In this way, on the one hand, I extend the scope of the meaning of the concept philology, but on the other hand, I believe, I am reinforcing Boeckh's judgment on philology and its significance as a methodology of science, both the humanities and the exact sciences (Boeckh 1886, 33, 804). This interpretation is reinforced by Alex Mesoudi's opinions on both culture and its cumulative nature (Mesoudi 2011; Mesoudi 2011a, 1-16). There remains, admittedly, Aristotle's term (ARIST., *metaph.*, 981 a 6-8; ARIST., *metaph.*, 983a4-15; also: ARIST., *metaph.*, 995a17-21)²⁴ difficult to accept: the knowledge of divine things, which seems to be a hidden parameter. However, if we treat it as a

others thanks to the tools of *téchne rhetoriké* used by philology in the study of literary works, to put forward and prove the correctness of the research hypothesis. Michael Schramm's study is an important voice confirming the views presented here (Schramm 2010, 83-121).

²¹ Transl. by <https://topostext.org/work/18>, (2025-04-07). According to English numbering it is verse 11.

²² See remarks in footnote 15.

²³ Cf. Lalande 1972, 612: *Elle [Aristote dans Métaphysique] comprend la connaissance des choses divines en meme temps que celle des principes des sciences et de l'action.*

²⁴ Aristotle's translation: *For the science which would be most suitable to God is divine science, as is every science which deals with divine matters; and this science alone has both these characteristics; for (1) God is believed to be one of the causes of all things, and to be the first principle; and (2) such knowledge can be possessed either by God alone, or by God above all others. Verily, all sciences are more necessary than this, but none is better. The English translation, however, may be somewhat different, cf. A science is divine if it is peculiarly the possession of God, or if it is concerned with divine matters. And this science alone fulfills both these conditions; for (a) all believe that God is one of the causes and a kind of principle, and (b) God is the sole or chief possessor of this sort of knowledge. because (a) everyone believes that God is one of the causes and a kind of principle, and (b) God is the sole or primary possessor of this kind of knowledge.] However, Aristotle's thought is identical in both cases; what is worse, it in a sense exhausts the meaning of the hidden parameter. For the second translation, cf.*

suggestion, quite obvious, that certain objects of our knowledge may contain not hidden parameter(s), but rather different possibilities of theoretical description of the same phenomena, then observations, experiments, etc. will allow us to verify theoretical assumptions. After all, Immanuel Kant spoke about this in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason when he pointed to the Copernican revolution in scientific thinking. This is confirmed by the quoted judgment of August Boeckh, that philology is the methodology of sciences, including non-philological sciences. Let us say it firmly: literature is the expansion of knowledge, or what we define after Aristotle as the knowledge of divine things, because, as the divine Homer will say in the Odyssey (H., O., XII.190): [...] we know everything [...] that happens on the whole earth that feeds the multitudes (in English it sounds better:): [...] we know all things that come to pass upon the fruitful earth).

Warsaw, 2025-04-07

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