Supriyanto

UIN Prof. K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri Purwokerto

DOI : https://doi.org/10.47191/ijsshr/v6-i2-54

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ABSTRACT

Claims about the truth are often still based on each person's point of view. Thus, the question arises what makes a belief true? Belief (belief) is an attitude towards a certain statement, as a relationship between the subject and the prepoisisi. There are several types of beliefs, (1) Dispositional belief, which is a preposition that we can but not accept or consider, (2) occurent belief, an acceptance of that proposition. In this study, two patterns of belief were found, namely internalist and externalism. The two stand in dichotomously different spaces. The debate between the two in contemporary epistemology appears focused on adequate explanations of epistemic justification. Internalists can provide justification for danya's beliefs by corresponding to their perspectives and views. Contrary to that, Externalism allows at least some justification factor of a belief to be outside the cognitive perspective of the agent.

KEYWORDS:

Justification, Internalism, externalism

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VOlUME 06 ISSUE 02 FEBRUARY 2023