Volume 07 Issue 05 May 2024
1Chinemerem Ojiego-Okoro, 2Dr. Lucy Chinwe Umeh, 3Dr. Destiny Uchenna Nwodom
1Department of History and International Studies, Godfrey Okoye Unuiversity, Enugu State, Nigeria.
2Department of Political Scienec and International Relations, Godfrey Okoye Unuiversity, Enugu State, Nigeria.
3Department of Political Science, Ebonyi State University, Nigeria.
DOI : https://doi.org/10.47191/ijsshr/v7-i05-94Google Scholar Download Pdf
ABSTRACT
In Africa, and notably the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), Boko Haram is a major threat to human security. The region, which spans 427,500 km2 and contains large ungoverned areas, is made up of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Boko Haram has been responsible for several attacks in Northeast Nigeria since 2003 and is also the leading cause of forced migration in the Lake Chad Basin. In northeastern Nigeria and other LCB countries, this insurgency has caused widespread migration and increased the humanitarian crisis, socio-economic, and environmental consequences. This research aims to examine the developmental challenges emerging from Boko Haram-induced forced displacement in the LCB. Empirical evidence suggests that the Lake Chad Basin countries’ governments have failed to contain this group's aggression. However, there are still gaps in the literature regarding how this insurgency has affected social and economic lives of displaced people in the region. The study utilized a case study design, documentary method of data collection, and content analysis as the analytical technique. The study applies the Human Security Theory and Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as the theoretical framework. Ultimately, the findings of this study revealed that forced migration severs social ties, leading to economic, social, and psychological impacts, including family separation and loss, with families often split up abruptly due to attacks and evacuation. In Addition, negative economic impacts disproportionately affect impoverished individuals, exacerbating chronic poverty and hindering their ability to escape poverty due to price volatility and wage declines. It was recommended that the governments of Lake Chad Basin countries should develop and implement policies that support the economic integration of refugees and displaced individuals, including measures to facilitate access to employment and promoting self-reliance and resilience. They should also foster initiatives that strengthen social ties and networks among displaced populations to facilitate integration into host communities and mitigate the negative impacts of social disconnection.
KEYWORDS:Forced Migration, Insurgency, Boko Haram, Lake Chad Basin
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